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ABSTRACT 
To develop an approach to utilizing continuous statistical information within the Dempster­
Shafer framework, we combine methods proposed by Strat and by Shafer. We first derive 
continuous possibility and mass functions from probability-density functions. Then we pro­
pose a rule for combining such evidence that is simpler and more efficiently computed than 
Dempster's rule. We discuss the relationship between Dempster's rule and our proposed 
rule for combining evidence over continuous frames. 
1The work reported here was supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under Contract 
MDA903-83-C-0027 and in part by the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Telecommunications. 
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1 Introduction 
The knowledge used in many expert systems 
can often be expressed in the form of con­
ditional probabilities, typically the conditional 
probability of making a particular observation 
when a given state holds. The Dempster­
Shaler paradigm provides a framework for deal­
ing with nonstatistical information, representing 
ignorance and combining evidence coming from 
multiple, independent knowledge sources. We 
propose an approach to the representation of sta­
tistical information within this framework, in or­
der to combine it with information from other 
sources. 
W hile Shafer [ 1] shows how this goal can 
be achieved for discrete probability distribu­
tions, probability distributions of interest are 
often continuous. Using Strat's technique [2j, 
we can derive mass functions from individual 
probability-density functions. To combine evi­
dence we can use Demspter's rule; however, in 
this context, Dempster's rule is computationally 
expensive [3J and yields very complex mass func­
tions without a simple intuitive interpretation. 
We therefore propose a rule for evidence combi­
nation that yields simpler results and show that 
this rule is both statistically sound and related 
to Dempster's rule. 
We begin by explaining how possibility 
and mass functions can be derived from a 
probability-density function. We then prove that 
the evidence can be pooled simply in a way that 
is statistically sound and amounts to an approxi­
mation of Dempster's rule. Finally we introduce 
an example showing how this result can be gen­
eralized to combine evidence that is statistical in 
nature with evidence that is not. 
2 Mass Function From Proba­
bility Density Functions 
In this section, we show how the basic method for 
statistical inference described by Shafer [1] can 
be used to handle probability-density functions. 
Suppose that an expert has stated his knowl­
edge about a system in the form of the condi­
tional probability of making an observation I 
when the system is in state 9, for all I and 0. 
Let F be the set of possible observations and e 
the set of possible states. Suppose that we now 
perform an experiment and observe I. Our goal 
is to assess our beliefs about the possible states 
of the system. 
If the prior probabilities of the states are avail­
able, Bayes' rule allows us to achieve this goal 
very simply. However, if they are not, beliefs 
can be assessed in the following way: 
We shall assume that the evidence favors the 
states 9 E 9 that maximize the probability of 
observing the actual outcome of the experience, 
which amounts to a maximum-likelihood esti­
mate. We therefore define a possibility function, 
poss that plays the same role as the possibility 
function in Zadeh's theory [5] and is such that 
VO E 9, poss(B) oc p(!l9) . 
If our evidence is unbiased and is free of sys­
tematic errors, there is no reason to disbelieve 
the results of the experiment. At least one state 
must be completely possible: we normalize poss 
so that 
maxposs(9) = 1 . 
' 
Such evidence can be represented by a consonant 
mass function mass and associated plausibility 
function pl such that 
voee, pl({9})=poss(9) . 
In this work, we restrict ourselves to the case 
in which the evidence bears upon scalar quanti­
ties and points in a single direction, but with 
some uncertainty. 9 can then be considered 
as an interval in the set of real numbers, and 
we shall assume that the possibility functions 
are unimodal, strictly monotonically decreasing 
about their maximum, differentiable, and have 
zero value on the boundary of e. 
As shown by Strat [2], under the above as­
sumption such a consonant mass function ex­
ists and is unique. Because poss is unimodal 
86 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and strictly monotonically decreasing about Zm, 
there exists a function u : [A, Zm] �--+ [zm, B] 
such that VI E [A,zm] poss(l) = poss(u(l)). 
Then, mass is defined as the mass function with 
focal elements the intervals [/,u(/)] such that 
dfpou{l)] 
sibility functions pointwise, normalize the prod­
uct and use it to derive a new consonant mass 
function, as described above (See Shafer [4] for 
a comparison of alternative techniques for com­
bining possibility functions). 
mass([l,u(l)]) = :m2 (l+d�l )! (1) 3.2 Comparison with Dempster's rule 
3 Combining the Evidence 
For these continuous possibility and mass func­
tions to be useful, we need to be able to combine 
the evidence from several knowledge sources. 
A x1 x2 
Figure 1: Two Possibility Functions 
We first define the following notation that will 
be used in the rest of this paper: Suppose that we 
perform two independent measurements It and 
12. From them, we can derive two possibility 
functions poss1 and poss2, shown in Figure 1, 
with maxima z1 and z2 and two corresponding 
mass functions m1 and m2 over e = [A, B]. 
3.1 A Simple Rule 
The possibility functions poss1(8) and poss2(8) 
are proportional to the conditional probabilities 
Pt(ft!O) and P2(f2!0). If the two measurements 
are independent, then 
Therefore a simple and statistically sound way 
to combine the evidence is to multiply the pos-
Another way to combine evidence is to use 
Dempster's rule. But when we combine our con­
tinuous mass functions, which have an infinite 
set of focal elements, a severe problem arises 
from the fact that the mass function resulting 
from the combination will be extremely complex 
and will not possess any simple intuitive mean­
ing. In particular, it will be highly nonconso­
nant. 
Let mpou be the mass function we derive from 
the product of the possibility functions by as­
suming consonance, and let mDemp.ter be the 
mass function that we obtain by "dempsteriz­
ing" ml and m2. Let plpou and plDemplter be 
the corresponding plausibility functions. 
In general, massDemp1ter will be nonconsonant 
and different from masspou. But the two mass 
functions assign proportional masses to single­
tons: 
vo ee 
plDemplter = 1�11 p/t({O})p/2{{8}) 
plpou = no!m plt({O})p/2{{8}) 
where k is Dempster's contradiction factor and 
norm= mazzee(posst{z)poss2{z)). 
Let a = 1 - k and zo be the point at which 
poss1 (x)poss2(x) reaches its maximum. Since 
'rfx E 9, plDemp•ter({z}) � 1, 
norm 
plDemp•ter({zo}) = -- � 1 a 
Therefore a is always greater than norm and 
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'r/8 E 9, plDemp.ter({O}) � plpou({O}) . 
This observation is the key to understanding 
the relationship between our multiplicative com­
bination rule and Dempster's rule. Plausibili­
ties can be viewed as upper bounds on proba­
bilities; therefore, plpo .. is less informative than 
plDemp•ter· But, because these bounds are con­
sistently bigger, no inconsistency with respect to 
Dempster's rule has been introduced. This is in­
tuitively appealing because, in order to derive 
mpou, we have assumed consonance. We have 
"cancelled out" the nonconsonance of fflDemp•ter 
that resulted from the conflict between m1 and 
m2, thereby losing some information. In par­
ticular, if the two possibility fuctions have the 
same maximum, there is no conflict at all be­
tween them and it can be shown that the two 
combination rules yield exactly the same result. 
We can thus combine the evidence by simply 
multiplying the possibility functions pointwise. 
their expression in terms of poss as in Eq. 1, the 
sum becomes an integral and we find the formula 
a= 
where poss'(x) is the derivative of poss with re­
spect to its argument. 
The agreement between two knowledge 
sources can therefore be computed directly from 
the possibility functions without computing the 
mass functions. 
In summary, by using our simple multiplica­
tive combination rule, we do not record the con­
flict between the two knowledge sources and 
therefore lose some information. But, because 
we can still evaluate Dempster's contradiction 
factor without computing the actual mass func­
tions, we are able to ascertain how good the ev­
idence is. We lose some information about the conflict be­
tween the two knowledge sources, but we shall 
show in the following subsection that the mag­
nitude of that conflict can be. estimated easily in 4 Example 
this context. 
3.3 Agreement Between Two Knowl-
edge Sources 
In the Dempster-Shafer framework, the conflict 
between two knowledge sources is represented by 
Dempster's contradiction factor k. 
For discrete mass functions m1 and m2, with 
corresponding plausibility functions pl1 and pl2, 
k is defined by: 
k= 
F,GeeandFnG=0 
Therefore, if we call a = 1 - k the agreement 
between the two mass distributions, we can show 
that 
a= L m2(F)pl1(F) = L m1(F)pl2(F) . 
Fee Fee 
We now replace the discrete mass functions 
with the continuous ones defined above. If we 
assume that :z:1 � :z:2, and replace m and pl with 
So far we have seen that we can derive continuous 
possibility and mass functions from probability­
density functions and combine them in a statis­
tically consistent manner. In the following ex­
ample, we show how we can extend the scope 
of these ideas to combine statistical information 
with nonstatistical information that has an obvi­
ous representation in the Demspster-Shafer for­
malism. 
Let us suppose that we are in court trying to 
determine whether a car was speeding or not. 
We have two pieces of evidence: 
1. A police officer has clocked the car with 
his radar, the characteristics of which are 
known. The technique described above can 
be used to represent this information by 
a possibility function possr peaking at 11,. 
shown in Figure 2(a) . 
2. A witness has testified that he was following 
the car and that, according to his speedome­
ter, its speed remained betwen 111 and 112. 
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(a) Radar report 
--- - j'j 
I 
Figure 2: 
I 
(b) W itness report 
Representing the evidence using 
possibility functions. 
Suppose we can assess the validity of such 
testimony and that there is a probability 
1-Pw for its being accurate. In other words, 
with probability Pw the witness is unreliable 
and his testimony is not informative. H the 
inherent inaccuracy of the speedometer is 
small compared with the width of the in­
terval [vl! v2], this information can be natu­
rally represented as a simple support func­
tion, with focal elements [vl, t12] and e with 
respective masses 1 - Pw and Pw· So far 
v1 v2. vr 
Figure 3: Combining the two reports. 
ster's rule; we therefore combine the evidence by 
computing and normalizing the product of the 
possibility functions, as shown in Figure 3. Al­
though possw is no longer continuous, the agree­
ment a can still be computed simply, yielding 
a= (1- Pw)poss,.(v2) + Pw 
norm= max(possw(v2),pw) 
H v1 � v,. � v2, the two reports agree, a = 1 
and there is no evidence against the maximum­
likelihood estimate v,.. If t12 < v,., the two reports 
star-t conflicting and the smaller v2 is, the greater 
the conflict. The maximum-likelihood estimate 
is either v2 or v,., depending on which report is 
more reliable; it can be shown that 1 - no;m 
represents the support, in the Dempster-Shafer 
sense, of the proposition "the speed is different 
from the maximum-likelihood estimate" and can 
be used as a measure of the validity of this esti-
mate. 
By multiplying the two possibility func­
tions, we are able to recover useful informa­
tion for decision-making. We avoid computing 
and "dempsterizing" the actual mass functions, 
which could be computationally expensive. Fur­
thermore, the result is a new possibility function 
that can again be combined in the same fashion 
with additional evidence. 
we have derived mass functions from possi­
bility functions, conversely, in this case we 
can define a possibility function possw as 
the contour function of our simple support S function, as shown in Figure 2(b) . Conclusion 
We have shown that in the case of continu­
Multiplying the possibility functions pointwise ous scalar quantities, we can use the Dempster­
can be viewed as an approximation of Demp- Shafer approach to derive possibility functions 
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and beliefs from probability distributions. The 
evidence can then be pooled very easily by mul­
tiplying the possibility functions pointwise. The 
approach is a consistent approximation of Demp­
ster's rule, and permits one to estimate simply 
the conflict between knowledge sources. In fu­
ture work, we shall generalize this approach to 
multivariate distributions. Because beliefs are 
expressed in the framework of evidential reason­
ing, they can be combined with those generated 
by any other kind of knowledge source; this is 
a very desirable feature for automated decision­
making. 
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